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lected as a condition to the pursuit of
Jimmy Swaggert Ministries v.
penalty
of $11,829.45, totalling
Board of Equalization of California:
$166,145.10 owed by Appellant.
activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed
STATE SALES AND USE TAX ON
Appellant filed a petition for redeterby the First Amendment [since] ... it
REUGIOUS MATERIAL IS NOT
mination with the Board, asserting that
restrains in advance those constituVIOlATIVE OF THE FIRST
the State's imposition of tax liability on
tionalliberties ofpress and religion and
AMENDMENT'S REliGION ClAUSES
the sale of religious materials violated the
inevitably tends to suppress their exerIn Jimmy Swaggert Ministries v.
first amendment. On review, the Board
cise. "Jimmy Swaggert Ministries, 110 S.
Board of Equalization of California,
deleted the penalty originally assessed,
Ct. at 694 (quoting Murdock, 321 U.S. at
110 S. Ct. 688 (1990), the United States
but otherwise held that the Appellant
113-14 (emphasis added». Similarly in
Supreme Court held the the imposition
was liable for the adjusted amount plus
Follett, the Supreme Court invalidated an
of California's general sales and use tax
interest. Pursuant to state procedural
ordinance which required all booksellers
on religious materials sold and distriblaw, the Appellant paid the taxes and
to procure a license to sell books by
uted by a religious organization was not
filed for a refund, which the Board subpaying a flat fee. Again, this particular tax
prohibited under the First Amendment's
sequently denied. Appellant then filed
was deemed unconstitutional because it
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.
suit in state court which entered judgacted as a prior restraint on constitutionThe Court cautioned, however, that its
ment for the Board. The California Court
ally protected religious conduct. Despite
of Appeals affirmed the lower court det1ndings were limited to the particular tax
this conclUSion, however, the Court caucision, and the California Supreme Court
tioned that "a preacher is not 'free from
at hand, and that similar taxes imposed
denied discretionary review. The United
all financial burdens of government, inon religious materials could very well
States Supreme Court noted probable jucluding taxes on income or property'
constitute a constitutionally Significant
risdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 1257
and, 'like other citizens, may be subject
burden on religious practices and beliefs.
(2).
to general taxation. ", Id. at 694 (quoting
Appellant, Jimmy Swaggert Ministries,
Before the Supreme Court, Appellant
Follett, 321 U.S. at 578).
is a religious organization incorporated as
argued that the imposition of the State's
In the case sub judice, the Court detera Louisiana nonprotlt organization and
sales
and use tax on religious materials
mined that Appellant's reliance on the
recognized as such by the Internal Revecontravenes both the Free Exercise and
aforementioned case law was misplaced.
nue Service. Its purpose, as set forth in its
the Establishment Clauses of the First
In its reasoning, the Court noted that
constitution and by-laws, is to "estabAmendment.
Appellant
also
asserted
that
although
Appellant's religious exercise
lish[] and maintain[] an evangelistic outthe
imposition
of
the
State's
use
tax
was
deserves
a
high claim to constitutional
reach for the worship of Almighty God."
violative of the Commerce and Due Proprotection, it nevertheless has not been
Id. at 691. In fulfilling this purpose, the
cess Clauses. The Supreme Court, howsignificantly burdened by a "general"
organization regularly conducts evangeever,
limited
its
review
strictly
to
sales and use tax that does not operate as
listic crusades across the nation, at which
a prior restraint, and which "'is not a flat
Appellant's first amendment assertions
it sells and distributes certain religious
and
declined
to
address
the
merits
ofthe
tax, represents only a small fraction of a
and nonreligious items. The organization
remaining
claim
for
procedural
reasons.
retail sale, and applies neutrally to all
also publishes and distributes nationwide
The Free Exercise Clause of the First
retail sales of tangible personal property
a monthly magazine, "The Evangelist,"
Amendment prohibits a state or federal
made in California." Jimmy Swaggert
which contains advertisements for salelegislative body from exerting any re110 S. Ct. at 695 (emphasis
Ministries
able religious and nonreligious items
straint on the free exercise of religion.
added). Moreover, the Court stated that
with corresponding mail-order forms. Id.
the registration requirement under CaliId. at 693. In deciding whether the State's
at 691-92.
imposition of tax was valid under the
fornia law did not act as a prior restraint
Under California law, retailers are reFree Exercise Clause, the Court stated
because it required no prepayment of a
quired to pay a 6% sales tax on all tangible
the the appropriate inquiry is "whether
fee and the tax was due regardless of
personal property sold within the state.
[the] government has placed a substanpreregistration. Id.at 696 (see Cal. Rev. &
In addition, out-of-state retailers selling
tial burden on the observation of a central
Tax Code Ann. §§ 606674(West 1987 &
tangible personal property to California
religiOUS belief or practice and, if so,
Supp. 1989». The Court, therefore, conresidents are reqUired to collect from said
whether a compelling governmental included that the general sales and use tax
purchasers a 6% use tax. During the tax
terest justifies the burden." Id. (quoting
at issue was more akin to a generally
period from 1974 through 1981, AppelHernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S.
applicable income or property tax, and
lant failed to pay the applicable sales and
680, 699 (1989». The Appellant in the
thus did not violate the Free Exercise
use taxes on religiOUS items it sold to
case sub judice, thereby asserted that
Clause of the First Admendment.
California residents. In 1980, the Board
"the State's imposition of use and sales
Appellant also argued that the general
of Equalization of California informed Aptax liability on it burden[ed] its evangelitax imposed a significant burden on its
pellant that sales of religious materials
cal distribution of religiOUS materials.
exercise of religious beliefs because the
were not exempt from tax. The follow.. ," relying heavily on Murdock v. Penntax and costs associated with administering year, the Board audited Appellant and
sylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) and Follett
ing it greatly reduced Appellant's income
advised it to register as a seller and report
v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944). Id.
by lowering the demand for wares
and pay all taxes accruing from sales it
In Murdock, the Supreme Court recaused by the marginally higher price.
made through mail-orders in California
versed the convictions of Jehovah's
However, relying onHernandezv. Comand at its California crusades. The Board
witnesses who were arrested for distribmissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (holding
estimated that Appellant earned
uting religious material without a license,
that the Government's disallowance of a
$1,702,942.00 from mail order sales and
in violation of a city ordinance which
tax deduction for religiOUS "auditing" and
$240,560.00 from crusade merchandise
required that all persons canvassing or
"training" services did not violate the
sales during the tax period. Based on
soliciting procure a license by paying a
Free Exercise Clause), the court stated
these figures, the Board assessed
flat fee. The Court struck down the ordithat "any such burden is not constitution$118,294.54 for sales and use taxes, an
nance as unconstitutional because the
ally significant." Jimmy Swaggert Minislicense tax imposed was "levied and coladditional $36,021.11 in interest, and a
tries, 110 S. Ct. at 696. Recognizing that
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Appeals. Tafflin v. Leritt, 865 F.2d
that the claim was procedurally barred
Appellant incurred sorne cost in cornply595(4th Cir. 1989). The Suprerne Court
under California state law. Therefore, the
ing with the generally applicable sales
granted certiorari solely for the purpose
Court concluded that the claim was not
and use tax, the Court noted that Appelof determining whether a state court has
properly before it.
lant is no rnore burdened by the imposiconcurrent jurisdiction over civil RICO
1bis case is Significant in that it adtion of such tax than it is by other
dresses a classical first adrnendrnent issue
claims.
generally applicable regulations, such as
In reaching its decision, the Suprerne
to
religion
and
the
free
exerpertaining
health and safety regulations, with which
Court began by ernphasizing the deep
cise thereof, yet adapts it to a rnore rnodAppellant already cornplies. Id
ernistic view. Today, rnore and rnore
rooted presumption in favor of concurIn its next argument, the Appellant
evangelists
are
thernselves
excessively
rent state court jurisdiction. This precontended that under Lemon v. Kurtzentangling religious and commercial actisumption is rebuttable only upon a
man, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the irnposivities, thereby making it difficult to disshowing that: (1) there is an explicit
tion of the sales and use tax was violative
between
the
two.
However,
the
tinguish
congressional statute granting exclusive
of the Establishment Clause in that it
Suprerne Court has atternpted to rernedy
federal court jurisdiction; (2) there is an
"foster [ed] 'an excessive government enthis confusion by upholding tax imposiunmistakable implication frorn legislatanglernent with religion' ... [by requirtions
on
the
sale
of
both
religious
and
tive
history dernonstrating Congressional
ing] on-site inspections of appellant's
non-religious rnaterials; the determinaintent to grant exclusive jurisdiction to
evangelistic crusades, lengthy on-site autive test being whether the tax can be
the federal courts; or (3) there is a clear
dits, examinations of appellant's books
neutrally
irnposed
regardless
of
content,
between state court jurisincornpatibility
and records, threats of criminal prosecuwhether it acts as a prior restraint on
diction and federal interests. Tafflin, 110
tion, and layers of administrative and jureligious liberty, and whether any State
S. Ct. at 795 (quoting Gulf Offshore Co.
dicial proceedings." Id at 697 (quoting
imposing
the
tax
can
rernain
activities
in
v. Mobile Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613). In addressing
detached and neutral frorn the religiOUS
(1981».
this contention, the Court focused on
organization itself.
Applying the Gulf Offshore factors,
whether the imposition of the tax re-Cathy A. Cooper
the Court rejected the idea that state
sulted in an "excessive 'involvernent becourts have been divested of jurisdiction
tween appellant and the State and'
Ta.Dlin v. Levitt: STATE COURT
over civil RICO actions "by an explicit
continuing surveillance leading to an imJURISDICTION OVER CIVIL RICO
statutory directive." Id. at 795, (quoting
permissible degree of entanglernent," as
ClAIMS NOT PREEMPTED
Gulf0jfshore, 453 U.S. at 478). Further,
provided under Walz v. Tax Comm'n of
In Tafflin v. Levitt, 110 S. Ct. 792
as the Petitioners conceded, there was
New York City, 397 U.S. 664 (1970);
(1990), the United States Suprerne Court
no express language in RICO granting
Jimmy Swaggert Ministries, 110 S. Ct. at
detennined that state courts have conexclusive
federal juridiction over civil
current juridiction over civil actions
698. In holding that the spirit and values
RICO claims. The jurisdictional grant in
of the Establishment Clause were not
brought under the Racketeer Influenced
RICO provides: "[a]ny person injured in
and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"),
even rernotely at issue in this case, the
his business or property by reason of a
18 U.S.c. §§ 1961.{)8.
Court noted that
violation of section 1962 of this chapter
the [tax] statutory scherne requires
Following the failure of Old Court Savmay sue therefor [sic] in any appropriate
neither the involvernent of state ernings & Loan, Inc. (hereinafter "Old
United
States district court .... " [d. at
ployees in, nor on-site continuing
Court"), the petitioners, non-residents of
796 (quoting 18 U.S.c. § 1964(c» (erninspection of, appellant's day-to-day
Maryland holding unpaid certificates of
phasis in orginal). The Court found
operations ... [and] [rn]ost signifideposit issued by Old Court, instituted an
Congress' use of "rnay" in RICO presuascantly, [it] does not require the State
action in federal district court against the
ive and noted that "[i]t is black letter law
to inquire into the religious content
respondents, fonner officers and direcof the items sold or the religious
... that the rnere grant of juridiction to a
tors of Old Court, the Maryland Savingscourt does not operate to oust a
rnotivation for selling or purchasing
federal
Share
Insurance
Corporation
the iterns, because the rnaterials are
state court frorn concurrent jurisdiction
(hereinafter "MSSIC"), fonner officers
subject to the tax regardless of conover the cause of action." [d. (quoting
and directors of MSSIC, Old Court and
tent or rnotive.
Gulf0jfshore, 453 U.S. at 479). AccordMSSIC's law finn, and Old Court's ac[d. at 699. Furtherrnore, the Court reingly, the Court found the grant offederal
counting firrn. In the cornplaint, the Pejected Appellant's assertion that the coljurisdiction over RICO cases to be pertitioners alleged several state law claims,
lection and payrnent of the tax irnposed
missive, not rnandatory. Id.
a clairn under the Securities and Exupon it a severe accounting burden.
Next, the Court considered the legislachange Act of 1934 (herinafter "ExThe Court stated that this allegation was
tive history of RICO . The Court found no
change
Act"),
and
a
civil
claim
under
clearly unsupported by the record
evidence that Congress considered the
RICO. The Respondents ftled a Motion to
which showed that any such burden
question of concurrent state court jurisDismiss
which
was
granted
by
the
diswas signillcantly eased by Appellant's
diction over civil RICO claims, rnuch less
trict court for two reasons. First, the dissophisticated accounting staff and cornany
suggestion of congressional intent to
court
granted
the
Respondent's
trict
puterized accounting systern. Even if
confer exclusive jurisdiction on the fedrnotion concluding that the Petitioners
substantial, the Court added that such
eral courts. The Petitioners posed two
failed to state a claim under the Exchange
record-keeping and adrninistrative burargurnents. First they contended that if
dens do not rise to a constitutionally
Act. The district court also determined
Congress had addressed the issue it
signillcant level. Id. at 698.
that the Petitioners' civil RICO claims
Finally, the Appellant asserted that the
would have granted the federal courts
would be disposed of in a pending state
use tax imposition violated the Comcourt action. Because the district court
exclusive jurisdiction. The Court rernerce and Due Process Clauses because
jected this argument refusing to specubelived that state courts have concurrent
of and insufficient "nexus" between the
jurisdiction over these claims, it deterlate as to Congress' intent. [d.
mined that federal abstention was
-State and itself as an out-of-state retailer.
Alternatively, the Petitioners relied on
appropiate. The district court ruling was
dicta in Sedima, S.P.R. V.L v. Imrex Co.,
The Court, however, refused to address
473 u.s. 479 (1985) andAgen0' Holding
afflrrned by the Fourth Circuit Court of
the rnerits of this claim due to the fact
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